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returned a verdict against Flynt and Hustler
but not Flynt Distributing Co. Falwe/l,
__ F.2d at __ .
On appeal, the defendants made the constitutional argument that since Falwell is a
public figure, the "actual malice" standard
of New York Times v. SuI/ivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), must be met before he can recover for emotional distress. In New York
Times, the Supreme Court determined that
libel actions brought by public officials
against the press can have a chilling effect
on the press, inconsistent with the first
amendment. Therefore, when a public official sues for libel based upon a tortious
publication, the defendant is entitled to a
degree of first amendment protection. Falwell, _ _ F.2d at __ . This protection
was extended to cases in which the plaintiff is a public figure. Curtis Publishing
Company v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
The court of appeals determined that
"since Falwell is a public figure and the
gravamen of the suit is a tortious publication, the defendants are entitled to the
same level of first amendment protection
in the claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress thllt they received in
Falwell's claim for libel." Falwell, _ _
F.2d at __. The court of appeals reasoned that "to hold otherwise would frustrate the intent of New York Times and encourage the type of self censorship which
the Supreme Court sought to abolish." Id.
at_._.
The court of appeals determined that the
issue then becomes what form the first
amendment protection should take in an
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Flynt and Hustler argued
that Falwell must prove that the advertisement was published with " ... knowing
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth,"
which is the "actual malice" standard of
New York Times v. Sullivan. Id. at __ .
Although the court agreed that the same
level of protection is due the defendants, it
did not believe that the literal application
of the "actual malice" standard is appropriate in an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. !d. at __ . The court
rationalized that when the "actual malice"
standard is applied to a defamation action,
no elements of the tort are altered. Therefore, the "actual malice" standard merely
increases the level of fault the plaintiff
must prove in order to recover in an action
based upon a publication. Id. at __ . If
the plaintiff was required to prove the defendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard of the truth in an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it
would add a new element to this tort and
significantly alter its nature. !d. at __ .
The court of appeals found that the New

York Times standard was misread by the
defendants because their argument emphasized the language "falsity or disregard
for the truth." Properly read, New York
Times focused on culpability, and the emphasis of the "actual malice" standard is
"knowing ... or reckless." [d. at __ .
The court of appeals analyzed the first of
the four elements of intentional infliction
of emotional distress under Virginia law,
which requires that the defendant's misconduct be intentional or reckless. This
element is precisely the level of fault that
New York Times requires in an action for
defamation. !d. at __ . The court found
that "the first amendment will not shield
intentional or reckless misconduct resulting in damage to reputation, and neither
should it shield such misconduct which
results in severe emotional distress." Id.
at __ .
The court of appeals further held that
when the first amendment requires the application of the "actual malice" standard,
the standard is met when the jury finds
that the defendant's "intentional or reckless misconduct" has proximately caused
the alleged injury. Here, the jury made
such a finding and thus the constitutional
standard was satisfied. Id. at __ .
The Falwell decision clearly distinguishes
recovery for emotional distress from recovery for defamation under the New York
Times standard and emphasizes that the
"actual malice" standard focuses on the defendant's alleged "intentional or reckless"
conduct, not whether the plaintiff can prove
the defendant's "knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth."

- J.

Russell Fentress IV
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Unkle v. Unkle: MARYLAND
DEFINES MARITAL PROPERTY
IN PERSONAL INJURY SUIT
In Unkle v. Unkle, 305 Md. 587, 505
A.2d 849 (1985), the Maryland Court of
Appeals for the first time considered the
issue of whether a spouse's inchoate personal injury claim which accrued during
marriage was marital property within the
contemplation of the Maryland Family
Law Article's definition of marital property.
The facts of the case are uncontroverted.
Gypsy Jo and William Edward Unkle were
divorced a vinculo matrimonio on November 11, 1984, by the Circuit Court for
Carroll County. In awarding marital property to Gypsy Jo, the court also awarded
her 20% of any monies received by William
from a pending personal injury case stemming from an injury received in August of
1983. The court awarded the money on an
"if, as and when paid basis."
The parties were separated at the time of
the accident. William resided with his
parents and received no assistance from
Gypsy. Although William had retained
counsel to represent him in the personal
injury case, no suit had been filed prior to
the issuance of the divorce decree.
William appealed the circuit court's decision to the court of special appeals and
the court of appeals granted certiorari
prior to that courts consideration of the
issue.
The court first undertook to define the
meaning of the word property, noting that
the Maryland cases have generally given
the word a very broad definition. Specifically, the court quoted Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115,437 A.2d 883 (1981),
wherein the court defined property as
"everything which has exchangeable value
or goes to make up a man's wealth-every
interest or estate which the law regards of
sufficient value for judicial recognition."
Unkle, 305 Md. at 590.
In Deering, the court recognized that a
spouse's unmatured, fully vested pension
rights were a form of marital property subject to equitable distribution under the
Maryland statute. The court concluded
that a spouse's pension right, "to the extent
accumulated during the marriage", was a
form of marital property and subject to
distribution. The court specifically noted
that a pension right was a contract right,
derived from the terms of an employment
contract. The court noted that a contract
right is "Not an expectancy but a chose in
action, a form of property." Id. at 591.
In addition, the court noted that in
Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347,493 A.2d
1074 (1985), it held that a professional deFal~ 1986rrhe Law Forum-9

gree did not constitute marital property
under § 8-201(e) of the Maryland Marital
Property Act since it had "no exchange
value on the open market." Id. at 591.
The court then turned its attention to
the instant issue, noting first that various
courts have considered the same issue with
varying results. The court undertook a
case by case analysis of the question. The
court noted that while some courts have
completely rejected the argument that a
personal injury award or settlement is
marital property, other courts have concluded that a personal injury case which is
pending at the time of divorce cannot be
marital property because ofits speculative
nature.
While the court was obviously swayed
by this argument, and relied heavily on it,
it is specious. The court has already allowed a nonvested pension right to be divided on a percentage basis, see Deer£ng v.
Deer£ng, supra at 891, and there is no reason why the same argument could not be
applied here.
The court then turned its attention to a
series of New Jersey cases which have addressed the issue. In D£Tolvo v. D£Tolvo,
131 N.J. Super. 72, 328 A.2d 625 (1974),
the court held that potential damages in a
personal injury case which occurred during marriage was a chose in action and, as
such, constituted marital property acquired
by the spouse during marriage and was
subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution of the marriage. D£Tolvo was affirmed in Landwehr v. Landwehr, 200 N.J.
Super. 56, 490 A.2d 342 (1985).
Reaching a contrary decision was Amato
v. Amato, 180 N.J. Super. 210,434 A.2d
639 (1981), another New Jersey intermediate appellate court case. Amato involved a spouse's unliquidated claim for
damages stemming from a medical malpractice case. The court concluded that
the damages were "peculiar to the injured
person, to seek to be restored or made
whole as he was before the injury." 434
A.2d at 642. Therefore, the court concluded that the monies "represent personal
property of the injured spouse, not distributable under the New Jersey Marital
Property Statute." Id. at 643. The court
carved out an exception, however, for
losses which diminish the size of the marital estate, i.e. lost wages and medical expenses, holding that such monies were "distributable when recovered." Id. at 644.
The Supreme Court of Washington, in
Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675
P. 2d 1207 (1984), gave a more concise explanation of the above rationale when it
stated:
The physical injury to the spouse, and
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the pain and suffering of the spouse
therefrom is an injury to the spouse
as an individual ... but on the other
hand, if the injury deprives the marital
community of the earnings or services
of the spouse, that is an injury to the
marital community.
The court of appeals noted that Washington, unlike Maryland, is a community
property state, but stated that the basic
premise is the same: the focus is on the
costs incurred by the couple and whether
they reduced the size of the marital estate.
The court of appeals then turned its attention to the Maryland case law analyzing
the Marital Property Statute, as well as the
Report of the Governor's Commission on
Domestic Relations Law (1978). After noting that the statute and case law call for the
court to consider both the monetary and
nonmonetary contributions when distributing property in a divorce, and that the
property rights of the spouses' be adjusted
fairly and equitably, the court noted that
the commission report explicitly noted
that the theory of equitable distribution is
that each spouse has a duty "to contribute
his or her best efforts to the marriage for
the benefit of the family unit." 305 Md.
at 587.
Given the above language, the court
goes on to announce its holding in the instant case. In one paragraph the court
states that since the claim was not "acquired" during the marriage, and arose by
purely fortuitous circumstances . . .
the claim is simply not the type of resource contemplated by the statutory
definition of marital property even
though, in part at least, payment of the
claim would produce monies which
would replenish marital assets previously diminished through payment of
medical expenses and the loss of wages.
Id. at 587
In announcing such a broad reaching decision the court of appeals has gone further
than most courts which have come down
on the same side of the issue. In Maryland,
according to the court, not even lost wages
or medical expenses which were originally
paid out of the marital estate may be replenished by an award from a personal injury case.
Given the facts of the instant case, i.e.
that the parties were separated at the time
of the accident, and that the wife incurred
none of the expenses of the accident, the
court probably reached an equitable decision. However, the court could have accomplished this without dealing with the
more complex issue presented here by ruling that under § 8-205 (8) of the Maryland

Family Law Article that Gypsy had not
contributed to this specific piece of marital
property. In addition, § 8-205 (10) allows
the court to consider "any other factor that
the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair
and equitable monetary award."
The court has left us with what may be a
classic example of bad facts making bad
law. By expanding its decision as far as it
did, the court may have reached a decision
that will be difficult to reconcile given different facts. One can picture a scenario
wherein a spouse is injured while living
with his/her husband/wife and expends
great sums of otherwise marital property
during the recovery process. By delaying
settlement in the personal injury case, the
injured spouse could conceivably deplete
marital funds and later receive a windfall.
Given the previous case law in the area,
this does not appear to be a result the court
of appeals would desire.
- W£lHam Cassara

Sharrow v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.:
INSURANCE COMPANIES'
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
WITH ATTORNEY CONTINGENCY
FEE CONTRACTS: A BROADER
RULE
In Sharrow v. State Farm Mutual Automob£le Insurance Co., 306 Md. 754, 511
A.2d 492 (1986) the Maryland Court of
Appeals, reversing the court of special appeals, held, in a case of first impression,
that an attorney stated a cause of action
against an insurer for tortious interference
with contract by alleging that the insurer
had capitalized on his client's need for
money by involving the client in settlement
negotiations.
The client, Donald Zorbach, was involved in an automobile accident with
another automobile insured by State Farm
and suffered personal injuries. Zorbach retained Ronald M. Sharrow as his attorney
where, pursuant to a written agreement,
Sharrow was to receive a specified percentage upon settlement or a slightly
greater percentage ifsuit was filed. During
his representation by Sharrow, Zorbach ran
into serious financial difficulties and requested that Sharrow advance him money.
Sharrow declined stating that it is unethical for an attorney to advance money to his
client and also stated that it would be unwise to approach State Farm with a similar
request. Against his attorney's advice and
without his knowledge, Zorbach contacted
State Farm and requested an advance on

